{Slavoj Žižek}

Medi tation on M ic he la nge lo’s
Christ o n the Cro ss
What occupies me in this essay is the meaning of the death of Christ, the question of
what really dies on the cross, and how to read this event.1 So I begin with the question of the
precise meaning of the death of Christ on the cross and further ask, what is it that dies on the
cross? Is it not the case that, for most of us anyway, trying to understand this issue leaves us
boggled and confused?
My claim is that, in a sense, our imagination of the picture of Christ dying on the
cross assumes a world in which God is up there somewhere, while we are here on Earth.
And then God sends a messenger—a son—down to us. But basically the whole thing fails.
The failure is proved by what happens in the narrative itself: The son returns up to Heaven
so God might be able to try it again. I think the moment we even start to think along these
lines, we raise the entire problem of sin as a debt requiring repayment (the doctrine of
atonement). This view of the crucifixion in terms of financial dealings—that Christ died to
pay for our sins—raises a basic question for us. The question here is: To whom? To whom
did God pay this debt? In the first centuries of Christianity the doctrine of atonement was
debated, and many different positions were taken. One of the Gnostic positions, which
looks reasonable in purely rational terms, states that the debt was paid to the Devil who is
the lord of earthly life, of fallen life. The idea is that God made a deal with the Devil: “I
want humanity back. I’ll pay you the highest price: My very own son.” But the problem
here is extremely serious. For example, I have asked traditional theologians a very simple
question: “Why did God have to die on the cross?” They say: “To pay for our sins.” Then
I ask: “To whom? Was there another guy with whom God had to make a deal?” Then they
rejoin: “No, Christ died out of a sense of justice.” Then I say: “Wait a minute, the moment
you say this you’re back in the pagan universe, where gods are just higher-level beings
much like us, and there is a kind of a cosmic justice controlling them as well. And what you
have effectively done is constructed a universe in which God, in all his power and glory, is
subordinate to the impersonal laws of abstract justice.” The upshot is that even God cannot
violate the impermeable laws of cosmic justice. But the way I see it, the whole point of
Christian ethics—the very core of it—is that yes, this can be done: God can abrogate the laws
of cosmic justice. The whole point of the Gospel’s good news is the subordination of this
cosmic law of impersonal justice. In other words, with the traditional view of the meaning
of Christ dying on the cross, the entire point of the irruptive logic of the Gospel would be
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domesticated under the banner of a pagan notion of “Justice.”
This is why I’m skeptical of attempts to unify all religions in the name of “Oneness.”
I think that all other religions, with the exception of Judaism, and up to a point, Islam, still
rely on the ethics of cosmic justice, in the sense that the good life means fitting into the
harmony of the universe. Evil is when a part of the whole excessively attaches importance to
itself, and justice means banishing the excessive part so that cosmic balance is reestablished.
The most elementary form of this ethics is found in Confucius. When asked, “What is a
good life?” Confucius says that it’s found in a proper, well-organized state: Through the
rectification of names, when a father is truly a father, when a king is truly a king, and a
woman truly a woman. In other words, we participate in the harmony of the universe when
each of us fulfills, respects, and fully identifies with our particular role.
The ethics of cosmic justice is—if I may be obscenely blunt—in a sense, protofascist. The definition of fascism is an obsession with organic unity. This is why fascists
hate liberalism. What fascists hate about liberalism is the idea—the fundamental idea of
political liberalism—that you, as an individual, independently of who you are—black, white,
man, woman—have a right to direct contact with the universal. This idea, apart perhaps from
Buddhism, appears primarily in Christianity, which holds, “I’m not only what I am—man,
woman, etc.—but what makes me great, or even immortal, is that I cannot be reduced to what
I am in my particular existence.”
I will argue for this thesis by using Michelangelo’s drawing Christ on the Cross. The
first thing that may be noticed about this drawing is that it’s unfinished, and the very reason
why it’s unfinished is interesting. We know that Michelangelo gave it to his close friend,
Vittoria Colonna—a passionate, intimate friend, not sexually, but intellectually. Colonna was
herself a wealthy woman, a patron of great artists of the time, and in her own way she was an
inspiring person. Then something mysterious happened. Michelangelo, immediately after
giving Lady Vittoria Christ on the Cross, wrote her an urgent message asking—demanding—
to be given back the work, since there was something terribly wrong with it. She, in a
hypocritical way, pretended to have lost it—“Oh, I must look for it”—but then admitted in
a letter that she was aroused by it, and asked him why he needed to have it returned. She
stared at the drawing—even resorting to using a magnifying glass, looking at it from every
angle imaginable, and putting it beside a mirror—intrigued, hoping to find what might be
wrong with it, as if the drawing contained some forbidden detail Michelangelo was afraid
would be discovered. And if we look at it now, we can clearly see a few interesting details.
The drawing renders the critical moment of Christ’s doubt and despair, the famous
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“My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?”2 As far as I know, for the first time in the
history of painting, an artist attempted to capture Christ’s abandonment by God the Father.
This moment was not one of pure ecstatic rapture but, on the contrary, was a moment of
despair. With this in mind we may ask: Why are Christ’s eyes more or less turned upwards?
His face does not express devoted acceptance of suffering but simply total raw suffering
combined with what? Here, if we examine the drawing carefully, we can’t help but notice
a series of unsettling details which indicate an underlying attitude of angry rebellion—of
defiance—and not of devoted acceptance. First, the two legs are not symmetrical. One
leg is raised, and here an amateur was already breaking the rules of how this event is to be
depicted, as if Christ is caught in the middle of an attempt to rise up. Christ is attempting to
liberate himself. But the truly shocking detail is the right hand. This is what perplexed Lady
Vittoria. The finger is raised up in a gesture that was commonly understood at that time.
The gesture is identified in Quintilian’s Rhetorics (Institutio Oratoria), the standard manual
of the era, and a work which was known to Michelangelo. According to Quintilian’s work,
this gesture functions as a sign of rebellious challenge. It signifies, “No, I don’t give way. I
persist in my rebellion.” So again, Christ’s “My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?”
is not a resigned or even a passive “Why?” that gently questions the Father. It is rather an
aggressive and accusatory “Why?!”
More precisely, there is in the drawing an implicit tension in the expression of
Christ’s face. On the one hand, there is despair and suffering. But on the other hand, we
can’t avoid reading the aggressive rebellion in his face, the defiant rebellious attitude signaled
by his right hand, as if the hand articulates the attitude the face doesn’t dare to fully express.
I would like to develop this idea of the hand, the fist, as an autonomous object of rebellion,
a rebellion that asserts one’s freedom. We can relate this to classical fairy tales, mythology,
and popular culture. For example, take the film Fight Club with Brad Pitt and Edward
Norton—a very disturbing film, which is problematic for some. The most fascinating,
painful scene is when Ed Norton’s character confronts his boss. Recall that instead of hitting
the boss, he starts hitting himself. And consider how this scene is shot: The act is not one
of a unified subject. When he’s confronting his boss, his fist starts to act as an object with
its own will. He tries to control it but it rebels against his own body. The significance and
rebelliousness of the fist might also be seen in other contexts. According to one anecdote,
Martin Heidegger—a philosopher for whom I have great appreciation—was visited by
another philosopher in Rome when Heidegger was in his pro-Nazi period. The visiting
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philosopher asks Heidegger: “How can you be for Hitler? He’s such a vulgar guy. Listen to
his speeches!” Heidegger replies: “No, no, forget about the speeches. Look at his fist, at his
hand, while he’s talking. That is the mystery. There’s something about the movement of the
hand: It expresses more.” And turning to German mythology, there is a wonderful story, one
of the fairy tales by the Brothers Grimm, called “The Egotistical Child.” In this story, a child
was so evil that God punished and killed him. But then, in a scene reminiscent of a Stephen
King novel, his fist began protruding up from the grave. They repeatedly added dirt to the
grave, but the boy’s fist still protruded. His mother then came with some tools and started
hitting the fist, until finally the boy accepted his own death.
This attitude of irrationality—not in the sense of madness, but irrationality in the
sense of an inability to justify matters in terms of a rational utilitarian calculation—is
crucial. We find it, for example, in Antigone. The story is well known, but what may have
been overlooked is that if we read Antigone with fresh eyes, we should think, “Yes, I am for
Antigone…But why am I for Antigone?” I will not repeat the story here, but when we read
it again, we might see that our reason for supporting her is not so self-evident. What Creon
tells Antigone, when he prohibits the funeral of her brother Polynices, is quite rational. From
the standpoint of a rationally functioning state power, whose primary concern is to maintain
public order, Creon is absolutely right. Creon explains: “Listen, we just had a civil war. If
I allow the public burial of Polynices, with all the proper funeral rights, then civil war will
erupt again. The whole city would be ruined.” And typically Antigone doesn’t deny this
reasoning, but simply insists on carrying out the funeral. My point here is not to condemn
her, but to emphasize that every rebellious movement has to begin with such incessant
insistence.
Let’s look to a figure that we might see as an American Antigone: Rosa Parks, the
hero in the fight against racism, a black woman on a bus who didn’t want to stand up to
let the white man sit down in her seat. I can imagine the rational response, thinking: “Yes,
African-Americans are suffering, my God. But why do you insist so forcefully here? Resist
in a more organized way. You will just cause further trouble.” But isn’t this very rational
attitude precisely an illusion? At some point action must be taken, even from a purely
utilitarian standpoint. The act of defiance might appear excessive, even when engaging with
something that is in itself trivial, because it insists, “No. I will go to the end here.” Another
story of fighting racism in the United States is E. L. Doctorow’s Ragtime. A film based on
Doctorow’s novel, made by Miloš Forman, tells a similar story. A white tramp shits on the
seat of a car belonging to a successful black middle-class man. A policeman arrives, and
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while he is not racist himself, he just wants to maintain order. The policeman says: “I know
this white guy is trash. I know he’s a problem. But please, let’s not make a bigger problem
here.” But the black man insists, and practically causes a civil war in the city. This is the
attitude I am referring to.
This brings me back to Michelangelo’s drawing. Can we not ask: Doesn’t Christ,
even if only for a moment, succumb to the temptation of egotistic rebellion? Who is who
in this scene that somehow articulates the formula of Goethe: No one but God himself can
stand against God? How can this attitude be read? I think some very interesting theoretical
and practical conclusions can be drawn from it, beginning with a wonderful slip that can be
found in Hegel’s works. When talking about the difference between Western Christianity
and Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Hegel makes an interesting slip. It is clearly a mistake
because, from reading Hegel’s other texts, we can clearly establish that he knew the mistake
he was making. Theologically, one of the great divisions between the two churches pertains
to the question of the origin of the Holy Spirit. For Western Christianity, the Holy Spirit
originates from God the Father and the Son together. For Eastern Orthodox Christianity, this
was thought to limit the authority of God the Father too much, so the Holy Spirit originates
only from God the Father. Hegel’s slip, however, states that in Orthodox Christianity the
Holy Spirit originates from both Christ and Father, but in Western Christianity the Holy Spirit
originates only from Christ, only from the Son—a very curious mistake. I think we may read
this as an honest Freudian slip. I think Hegel was right in a way. Why?
Let me present a few quotes from G. K. Chesterton, whom I consider to be one of
the best Catholic theologians from Britain. This is how he defines what he calls the central
mystery of Christianity—and the link between what he saw as the mystery of Christianity
and Michelangelo’s drawing will be immediately clear:
When the world shook and the sun was wiped out of heaven, it was not at the
crucifixion but at the cry from the cross (“My God, My God, why have you forsaken
me?”), the cry which confessed that God was forsaken of God. And now let the
revolutionists choose a creed from all the creeds and a god from all the gods of the
world, carefully weighing all the gods of inevitable recurrence and unalterable power.
They will not find another god who has himself been in revolt, nay, (the matter grows
too difficult for human speech) but let the atheists themselves choose a god. They
will find only one divinity who ever uttered their isolation; only one religion in which
God seemed for an instant to be an atheist.3
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That is Chesterton’s key point, which is not to say that he was not a deeply respected
Catholic. I think he took the implications of this point to the end, a point that I’ll return to
below.
Recently at a debate in Vienna, I asked a few bishops a very simple question. They
were perplexed and didn’t give me a clear answer. I asked, “When Christ says ‘My God, My
God, why have you forsaken me?’ is he bluffing or not?” If he is in fact bluffing—and by
bluffing I mean that he is simply saying this aloud but secretly knows that he is God—then
the crucifixion is not serious. It is just a spectacle staged for humans. But if we take Christ’s
statement seriously, then the implication is extremely radical. We must not forget that in
Christian theology, Jesus Christ is not thought of in the same way as messiahs in other
religions. Christ is not a representative of God; he is God. This means that God is radically
split. A part of God doesn’t know what God is doing. There is a kind of inconsistency in
divinity itself, which is I think the crucial insight of Christianity. This is why I ask: How can
we rejoin God? In other religions God is a simple transcendence: We are here in our sinful,
terrestrial life, but if we purify ourselves, it’s possible for us to get closer to and be rejoined
with God. In Christianity, when it’s said that the only way to God is through Christ, I think
what’s implied is precisely this Christ at the moment of doubt on the cross. This is why
for Christianity you can, paradoxically, only reach God through this moment of doubt. As
Chesterton put it, God himself becomes, for a moment, an atheist. The idea is as follows:
We experience the utmost despair and alienation. We are here, God is there. We are totally
abandoned by God. How then in authentic Christianity do we reach God? Not by somehow
magically overcoming this gap, but just by means of a shattering insight at the very point
when we are abandoned by God. There we occupy the position of Christ. What was thought
of only as alienation from God is the position of Christ himself: God abandoned by God.
That is why, for Chesterton, Christianity is terribly revolutionary: “That a good man
may have his back to the wall is no more than we knew already: but that God could have his
back to the wall is a boast for all insurgents forever. Christianity is the only religion on earth
that has felt that omnipotence made God incomplete. Christianity alone has held that God,
to be wholly God, must have been a rebel as well as a king.”4 We could go on tracing out
the implications of this in political theology. The film V for Vendetta with Natalie Portman
may be considered here—although in the end it wasn’t radical enough. What I thought
would happen in that film simply did not; evidently, the filmmakers were too afraid and
didn’t want to take it to the end. In the film, Britain is reconstituted as a totalitarian country
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with a dictator who is only seen through television screens, and a famous masked rebel
fights against him. A series of signs hints at the link between the two. If the film had been
courageous enough, in the end, when the rebel dies and his mask is removed, we would have
seen that the rebel is none other than the dictator, fighting himself. But unfortunately, the
film was not radical enough.
Now Chesterton is fully aware that here we are approaching a matter dark and awful,
one that is difficult to discuss, a matter which the greatest saints and thinkers justly fear
to approach. In the terrific tale of the Passion is a distinct emotional suggestion in some
unthinkable way not only of agony, but also of doubt. Returning to Christ’s “My God, My
God, why have you forsaken me?” Christ himself commits what is for Christians the ultimate
sin: Wavering in one’s faith. So again, while in other religions, there are people who do
not believe in God, it is only in Christianity that God does not believe in himself. And here
Chesterton reports an insightful anecdote when he visited Jerusalem in the early twentieth
century. He tried to ask an Arab boy who spoke a bit of English: “Where is the garden?”
The boy asked if he meant the place where God himself prayed. Chesterton claims that
this is unique: In other religions you pray to God, but only in Christianity does God pray to
himself.
The image of a suffering Christ who does not believe in himself brings us back to the
Old Testament, to the Book of Job, which is praised by Chesterton as the most interesting of
ancient books. But then Chesterton adds that it is also the most interesting of modern books.
Now in what, according to Chesterton, does the modernity of the Book of Job consist? I
recommend returning to this text and reading it again carefully. I find the Book of Job, if
read closely, to be the first example of what we today call the critique of ideology. Why? To
begin with it is really a shattering piece, not because of the obscenities that we all know—
God and the Devil having a nice after-dinner conversation, with drinks, and God exclaiming,
“Oh, I have a sucker who believes in me. No way can you corrupt him. Forget about that.”
And I wholly buy into the story that the narrative is probably the remainder of some previous
pagan mythology. But there is another absolutely crucial thing that happens in the text. We
know the story: Things go really badly for Job. He loses—and I always liked this obscenity
in the Bible—his children, goats, chickens. Basically things look really bad for Job, but then
what happens? Three theological friends come, and each of them tries to convince Job of
something. Here we must be very precise: They try to convince him that if things are bad
for him, he must have earned it somehow. The reasoning of the first theological friend is that
if you suffer, even if you don’t know what for, you must have done something to deserve
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it. The second and third give more articulate, refined arguments. For example, one of them
replies with something along the lines of, “Maybe God is testing Job.” What the three of
them share is the idea that Job’s suffering and misfortunes have a deeper meaning. That is
their basic message: It isn’t just a trauma without meaning, there’s a deeper significance to
the event. If we read Job’s answers closely, we don’t see him insist that he’s innocent—he
doesn’t play the part of the pure, beautiful soul who says, “I didn’t do anything…Why this?”
Rather we see him insist, “No matter what I did, I don’t accept that this terrible event has
some deeper meaning.” And then comes the big surprise, when God appears at the end, and
says that everything the three theological idiots said was wrong, and every word that Job
said was true. God directly takes the side of Job. And what is God’s answer? Again, it is
usually misread as implying a simple divine absolute otherness: “Who are you even to talk
to me? Who are you, miserable idiot? I created this and that, and you must just accept my
radical transcendence. Don’t even think—how dare you to think!—that you can even begin
to understand me.” This is the usual reading of the Book of Job: “Trust in God, but accept
the divine absolute transcendence.” In other words, the final reply of God is usually read as
implying that there is a deeper meaning, but that there’s no way we will get it: “Just trust that
I know. It’s not yours to know.”
I claim that this is exactly what we shouldn’t do. If the book is read more closely,
I think we will arrive at the conclusion of Chesterton. What is his conclusion here?
Chesterton states that “the mechanical optimist endeavors to justify the universe avowedly
upon the ground that it is a rational and consecutive pattern.”5 The rationalist points out that
the fine thing about the world is that it can all be explained. But this is the one point which
God’s reply explicitly opposes—if I may put it so—to the point of violence. God says, in
effect, that if there is one fine thing about the world, as far as men are concerned, it is that
it cannot be explained. He insists on the inexplicableness of everything. In the Book of
Job, the Father—out of whose womb came the ice—goes further, and insists on the positive
and palpable unreasonableness of the cosmos. Also in the Book of Job (38:26) God states:
“Hast thou sent the rain upon the desert where no man is, and upon the wilderness wherein
there is no man.”6 Again, to startle man, God becomes, for an instant, a blasphemer. One
might almost say that God becomes, for an instant, an atheist. He unrolls before Job a long
panorama of created things: the horse, the eagle, the raven, the wildebeest, the peacock,
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ostrich, and crocodile. He so describes one that it sounds like a monster walking on the sand;
the whole is a sort of solemn rhapsody of the sense of wonder. The maker of all things is
astonished at the things he has himself made. Again, here the point is not that God knows the
deeper meaning, but it is as if God himself is overwhelmed at the excess of his creation. As
Chesterton puts it in wonderful terms, Job addresses God with a question mark, but God does
not provide an answer; he merely, as it were, repeats the question, as if you asked me: “Why
is this happening?” and I say: “Yes, that’s it.” It is almost a semantic misunderstanding: You
ask me a question of contempt—“Why is this?!”—and I take it as a yes or no question, and
say, “Yes, so it is.” Which brings us back to the problem of the crucifixion.
I believe that the Book of Job has to be read as prefiguring the death of Christ. What
God denies at the end of the Book of Job is the idea that somewhere there is what in Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory would be called the Big Other, a kind of a guarantee of global meaning
which could be a solace for us: “Things might be terrible and confusing, but at least God
knows that all of this has some deeper meaning.” I claim that this is an unsatisfactory
reading. And I have many theological friends who agree with me that this God, this Big
Other—this guarantee of global meaning on whom we can rely—is precisely what dies on
the cross. As Hegel puts it, what dies on the cross is not an earthly representative of God;
what dies on the cross is the very God of the beyond—which returns us to Hegel’s slip. This
is why, as Hegel points out, what we have after crucifixion, the resurrected God, is neither
God the Father nor God the Son—it is the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the love between
believers; it is the spirit of the community of believers, according to the famous words of
Christ: “For where two or three have gathered together in my name, I am there in their
midst.”7 I think this passage should be taken literally.
So what does this mean? Even today, the message is very radical. The temptation to
be resisted is the temptation of meaning itself. Perhaps the clearest instance—which might
be the worst recent example of pseudo-Christianity or pagan thinking—is the infamous
reactions of Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson to the 9-11 bombings. They said this was divine
punishment: “God lifted his protection from the United States because of our sinful way
of life.” Incidentally, Falwell and Robertson basically said exactly the same thing that the
massing fundamentalists have been saying.
A related metaphor which I have always found offensive is that of evil as a stain on
a painting. The idea is one that is endlessly reproduced by theologians and philosophers
who attempt to assert the harmony of the universe—the idea that what appears to us as evil
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is just like an apparent stain in a picture. If you look at a picture too closely, you see it as a
meaningless stain. But if you withdraw to a proper distance, you see that what appeared as a
stain actually contributes to global harmony. Similarly, what appears to us as evil is just the
result of our constrained perspective; from a proper distance we would see that it contributes
to global harmony; evil has a deeper meaning. But this presents a big problem in considering
phenomena like gulags, the Holocaust, and all the horrors of the twentieth century. Can
we really play this game, for example, with Auschwitz, and the other concentration camps?
Are we ready to say: “Oh, it appears to us as a stain, but if you have true wisdom, you will
see how Auschwitz contributes to the harmony of the world”? I don’t know what kind of
harmony can be paid with the death of millions in gas chambers.
I claim that Christ died on the cross precisely to reject such attempts at finding a
higher purpose or meaning. Rather the message is: “Your standards matter to me. I throw
myself into creation, and abandon my place up there.” The conclusions are radical. The
ultimate meaning of Christianity for me is a very precise one. It is not: “We should trust
God. The big guy’s with me, so nothing really bad can happen.” That is too easy. The
message is not: “We trust God.” The message is rather: “God trusts us.” The gesture of
Christ says, “I leave it over to you.” Usually we read religion as the way to guarantee
meaning: We are concerned with the small details of everyday life and never know what will
come of it all, or how things will turn out; we can only make wagers, and we do this maybe
to ensure that God will arrange things in our favor. But the meaning of the death of Christ
for me is the opposite: God made the wager on us. It is really a crazy wager, where God is
saying: “I leave it to you. Holy Ghost, community of believers, you have to do it!”
Many of my atheist friends say to me: “Yes, so this is atheism: There’s no god up
there, we create god in our image, etc.” But it is not that: I don’t think one can translate
theology into secular humanism. Not because of any secret, obscure reason, but because
there must be a moment of thinking that it is not we who are acting, but a higher force that
is acting through us. This element has to be maintained. Here I cannot resist bringing up
a metaphor that may be dangerously obscene for some. When people ask me whether I
am an atheist, and what I think the Christian rituals of drinking the blood and eating the
flesh of Christ mean, I tell them to read Stephen King and they will get it. In films like The
Terminator and others like it, and in many horror movies, there is sometimes a scene where
the hero is possessed. There is a bad guy who is not really bad, but is possessed by an alien.
Then the good guys think they’ve destroyed the possessing alien, but some slimy residue
of the alien is left lying around. Then comes the standard shot, where the camera slowly
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approaches the residue, and what we thought was just a bit of squashed alien starts to move
and organize itself. We leave the film with the alien organizing itself. This is the divine
element. I think horror movies are the negative theology of today. I don’t think we can
understand the logic of negative theology without appreciating good horror movies. It is as
if the good guys in such horror movies are like Roman soldiers: They thought they destroyed
everything in Christ, but that little bit of alien residue remained and started to organize itself
into the community of believers. That is a crucial point. Again, what I’m saying here cannot
be reduced to simplistic humanism. I think this is the legacy of Christianity—this legacy of
God not as a Big Other or guarantee, but God as the ultimate ethical agency who puts the
burden on us to organize ourselves.
This is also reminiscent of a crucial moment in American trade unions and workers’
movements. In the film Woodstock, Joan Baez performs a classic American working-class
song called “Joe Hill.” It is wonderful and naïvely theological: A worker dreams of Joe Hill,
who was a trade union organizer executed in the 1920s, having been wrongly accused of
murder. When Joe Hill appears in the dream, the worker says, “But Joe, you’re dead. How
can you be here?” But Joe says, “It takes more than a gun to kill a man.” And then the
dreamer says, “But where are you alive?” Joe says, “Wherever you organize a strike, Joe Hill
is there.” This is a working-class, trade union version of the process of organization, of what
happens whenever two or more organize themselves. According to a wonderful formulation,
what has power cannot be killed; it only goes on to organize itself.
This link between Christian community and the progressive movement is crucial.
And here I’m not playing a cheap game of identifying radical political movements as a
kind of religious community; what I’m referring to is the idea of a radical community of
believers. The ideal is neither that of blind liberal individuals collaborating with each
other, nor the old organic conservative community. It is a community along the lines of the
original Christian community: A community of outcasts. We need this today, this idea of an
egalitarian community of believers that is neither the traditional heretical community nor the
liberal multiplicity. This is why I and many other leftist philosophers, such as Alain Badiou
and others, are so interested in rereading, rehabilitating, and reappropriating the legacy of
Paul. It is not just a matter of private religious convictions. I claim that if we lose this key
moment—the moment of realizing the Holy Spirit as a community of believers—we will live
in a very sad society, where the only choice will be between vulgar egoist liberalism or the
fundamentalism that counterattacks it. This is why I—precisely as a radical leftist—think
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that Christianity is far too precious a thing to leave to conservative fundamentalists. We
should fight for it. Our message should not be, “You can have it,” but “No, it’s ours. You are
kidnapping it.”
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